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result in the financial rain of the owners, the applidation for an
injunction must be sustained by strong and convincing testimony;
in other words, a plain case of nuisance, and with it irreparable
injury must be established. While the inconveniences and annoy-
ances to the two appellees in this case must be conceded to exist,
the facts developed do not authorize an interference by the chan-
cellor, and the judgment below is therefore reversed with directions
to dismiss the petition.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY.2
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 3
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF NEW JERSEY.
ADMIRALTY.
Salvage-Joinder of actions in rem and in personam- Volunteer
Service.-Salvors cannot proceed against a ship and cargo in rem, and
against the consignees of the cargo -in personam, in the same libel:
Steamboat Ma/fylower v. Steamboat Sabine, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1879.
An action inpersonam for salvage cannot be maintained against the
owner of the property saved unless the service was performed at his
request. Id.
AGENT. See Broker.
ASSIGN3MENT. See Negotiable Instruments.
ATTORNEY. See Criminal Law.
Purchase byj, at sale of Client's Property- Jlien sustained.-While
purchases at judicial sales in the name of the solicitor for the party
whosc property is sold will be scrutinized with jealous care, they will be
sustained if no injustice is thereby done to such party: Pacific Rail-
road Co. v. Ketchum, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
BAILMENT.
Pledgor and Pledgee- Goods obtained by Fraud from Pledgee and re-
pledged.-D. & Co. deposited certain goods with the plaintiffs as security
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
iled during Oct. Term 1879. The cases will probably be reported in 11 Otto
2 Selected from late numbers of the Law Reports.
s From A. Wilson Norris, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 90 Penna. St. Reports.
From Hon. John H. Stewart, Reporter; to appear in 32 N. J. Eq. Reports.
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for an advance; they afterwards obtained possession of the goods by
fraudulently representing to the plaintiffs that they had sold them to the
defendants, and would hand over to the plaintiffs the money to be re-
ceived in payment. D. & Co. obtained an advance from the defendants,
and deposited the goods, with a power of sale with them: Held, by the
Court of Appeal, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division,
that as the plaintiffs had parted with their special property in the goods
to D. & Co., they could not recover them in an action from the defend-
ants who had obtained them bona fide and for a good consideration:
Babcock v. Lawson, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. Div.
BILL OF LADING.
.Negotiability-Definition of- Transfer of Stolen Bill-Statute- Con.
struction of.-Negotiability is a technical term applied to a contract, and
signifying the capability of being transferred by endorsement and
delivery, so as to give the endorsee a right to sue in his own name. It
does not necessarily include all the incidents attached to the endorse-
ment of bills of exchange and promissory notes, such as the right of a
bona fide purchaser of a stolen bill to enforce its payment: Shaw v.
Merchants' National Bank, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Statutes making bills of lading negotiable by endorsement and delivery,
or in the same manner as bills of exchange and promissory notes, do not
put these instruments in all respects on the same footing, and a pur-
chaser of such a bill of lading after it had been stolen, who had reason
to believe that his vendor was not the owner, takes no title as against
the true owner. Id.
BILLS AND NoTEs.
Transfer of- Guarantee in place of Endorsement-Rights of Holder.
-A guarantee of payment written .on the back of a promissory note by
the payee is not an endorsement, and the transferee takes subject to the
equities between the original parties: Central Trust Co. v. First Na.
tional Bank of Wyandotte, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
BROKER.
Concealment of Facts from Principal-Collusion with Purchaser-
Equitable Relief.-A real estate broker employed to find a purchaser for
land, is bound to disclose to his principal any facts known to him, mate-
rial to the transaction, and, if the broker takes part in the negotiation,
he is bound to exert his skill for the benefit of his principal: Young v.
Hvghes, 32 N. J. Eq.
Purchasers obtaining a contract for the sale of land through a real
estate broker who, with their knowledge and in collusion with them, has
concealed material facts from his principal, or exerted his skill in the
negotiation against his principal, cannot in equity enforce the contract,
and such a contract will be set aside: Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See Husband and Wife.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Injury caused by act done under Statutory Authority-Consequential
Damages for Property taken for Public use-Evidence as to worthlessneas
of Property taken.-Where, under the authority conferred by an Act
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of Assembly, a bank and stone wall are erected to prevent an overflow"
of water from a river, damages cannot be recovered for an injury to a
ishery occasioned thereby: Tinicum Fihing Co. v. Carter, 90 Penn.
St.
Such damages are merely consequential, and the constitutional pro-
vision, that compensation shall be made to the owner of property taken
for public use, does not apply to such damages: Id.
In a suit for damages for injury to a fishery, to prevent a recovery, it
is not necessary to show that the fishery was entirely destroyed, but it
is sufficient if it be shown that it was worthless: Id.
Taking Private Property for Public use- Wrongful and unauthorized
aeizure by Officer-Jurisdiction of Court of Claims.-The maxim thai
the king can do no wrong, has no place in our system of constitu-
tional law, as applicable either to the government or to any of its officers:
Langford v. United Staes, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Where the seizure of property by an officer of the government is
wrongful and unauthorized, and would, as between individuals, amount
to a tort, no implied contract to pay on the part of the government
is raised such as is necessary to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction:
Id.
Whether, when the government takes avowedly private propeity for
public use, in a manner to make the taking the act of the government,
the just compensation for such property guaranteed by the Constitution
can, in the absence of'any other provision of law, be recovered in the
Court of Claims: Quere? Id.
CONTRACT. See Mortgage.
Sale of Goods- Offer, til when open-Refusal of Offer, what amounts
to-Revocation of Offer. when effertive.-The defendant, being possessed
of warrants for iron, wrote from London to the plaintiffs at Middles-
borough, asking whether they could get him an offer for the warrants.
Further correspondence ensued, and ultimately the defendant wrote to
the plaintiffs, fixing 40s. per ton, net cash, as the lowest price at which
he could sell, and stating that he would hold the offer open till the fol-
lowing Monday. The plaintiffs, on the Monday morning at 9.42, tele-
graphed to the defendant: "Please wire whether you would accept forty
for delivery over two months, or if not, longest limit you could give."
The defendant sent no answer to this telegram, and after its receipt on
the same day. he sold the warrants, and at 1.25 I. Dr., telegraphed to
plaintiffs that he had done so. Before the arrival of his telegram to
that effect, the plaintiffs having, at I P. Dr., found a purchaser for the
iron, sent a telegram at 1.34 1. Dr., to the defendant, stating that they
had secured his price. The delndant refused to deliver the iron, and
thereupon the plaintiffs brought an action against him for non-delivery
thereof. The jury found, at the trial, that the relation between the
parties was that of buyer and seller, not of principal and agent. The
state of the iron market was very unsettled at the time of the transac-
tion, and it was impossible to foresee when the plaintiff's telegram was
sent at 9.42 A. Dr. how prices would range during the day: field, by
LUSH, J., that under the circumstances the plaintiff's telegram at 9.42
ought not to be construed as a rejection of the defendant's offer, but
merely as an inquiry whether he would modify the terms of it, and that,
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although the defendant was at liberty to revoke his offer before the close
of the day on Monday, such revocation was not effectual until it reached
the plaintiffs; consequently the defendant's offer was still open when the
plaintiffs accepted it, and the action was, therefore, maintainable. Cooke
v. Oxley. 3 T. R. 653, discussed; Byrne & Co. v. Leon van Tienhoven &
Co., 49 L. J. (C. P.) 316, followed: Stevenson v. JWcLean, Law Rep. 5
Q. B. Div.
CORPORATION. See Errors and Appeals.
COURT.
Improper execution of Process-Power to institute Inquiry.-If a court
is incidentally informed, or has reason to believe, that its process has not
been properly executed, and that injustice is likely to ensue, it is proper
for it, of its own motion, to interfere temporarily so that the matter can
be inquired into: Chamberlain v. Lamed, 32 N. J. Eq.
Power to make Rules-Admission of Evidence.-It is within the
power of a court to make a rule, to allow an instrument to be admitted
in evidence without proof of its execution, unless the opposite party
give notice that he requires such proof to be produced: Reese v. Reese,
90 Penn. St. -
CRIMINAL LAW.
Counsel assigned by Court-Fees of-Not payable ly County.-Where
counsel are assigned by a court to defend a pauper criminal, the county
wherein the trial is had is not bound to pay their fees, nor even the ex-
penses incurred in the preparation and course of the trial. One of the
incidents of the office of counsel, who is an officer of the court, is to de-
fend such prisoners gratuitously: Wayne County v. Waller et al., 90
Penn. St.
At common law no money can be drawn from the public treasury ex-
cept by virtue of a statute. In Pennsylvania the courts have always
proceeded on the safe principle of requiring statutory authority, either
in express terms or by necessary implication, for all claims upon the
public treasury. If counsel, therefore, make advances on account of
the defence of a pauper criminal, they cannot recover such advances
from the county: Jd.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Trustee.
DIVORCE. See Rusband and Wife.
EQUITY. See Broker; Estoppel; M ortgage; Pleading.
Staying Proceedings at Law-Evidence discovered after Judgment.-
Evidence newly discovered, relevant and material, which appears not to
have been ndiscovered through the appellants' laches or negligence,
consisting of a letter and also a written agreement in respondents' pos-
session during the trial at law, constitutes ground sufficient for staying
proceedings on the judgment obtained at law, and for ordering a retrial:
Cairo and Fulton Railroad Co. v. Titus, 32 N. J. Eq.
ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Decree of Appellate Court-Power of lowoer 6(urt to enlarge Order of
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Restitutio.-A court below cannot engraft on a decree of the Supreme
Court an order of restitution not contained in said decree. If restitu-
tion be ordered it is a constituent part of the judgment, but if not found
therein it cannot be made a part thereof by the lower court, whose duty
is limited to enforcing the decree without any enlargement or change in
its legal effect: Hughes's Appeal, 90 Penn. St.
Charge of Court.-Although parts of a charge, when taken separately,
may seem to be erroneous and indicate a leaning to one side or the other,
there is yet no error, if taken as a whole, the questions at issue are fairly
left to the jury: Reese v. Reese, 90 Penn. St.
Decree by Consent-Jurisdiction-Fraudulent consent by Solicitor-
Remedy.-Uuder sect. 692, Rev. Stat., an appeal from a decree rendered
by consent must be received and decided, but the court will not consider
any errors which were waived by the consent: Pacific Railroad Co. of
Mo. v. Ketchum, S. C. U. S., October Term 1879.
The remedy of a stockholder for the fraudulent consent of the soli-
citor or officers of a corporation to a decree, is by an appropriate proceed-
ing in the court where the consent was received and acted upon and not
by an appeal from the decree : Id.
ESTOPPEL.
In pais- Ground for Injunction against Proceeding at Law- What
facts constitute.-Estoppels in pais, such as have always been known to
equity, afford a foundation for a court of equity to enjoin proceedings at
law involving such estoppel: Society for Establishing Useful Manufac-
tures v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 32 N. J. Eq.
It is not every estoppel in pais which is available at law as well as in
equity, that will have this effect; but when the estoppel grows out of
transactions varied in their character and occurring at intervals through
a long period of time, which may be available only on equitable terms,
it will afford a foundation for equitable intervention : Id.
Where a canal company had, for over twenty years, been in the un-
disputed possession of water, which, before that period, had been in liti-
gation with a riparian owner who knew that the canal company was about
to lease its works, which were materially dependent on such water, and
such riparian owner took no measures to revive the old litigation, or to
give notice of such claims before the lease was given : Hield, that ground
was laid for the claim of an equitable estoppel in behalf of the lessee, and
that he had a sufficient standing in a court of equity to enjoin suits at
law calling in question the right to such water: Id.
EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law; Court.
Unsupported Testimony of Interested Party.-The Act of 1869 having
made parties to an action competent witnesses for all purposes, the evi-
dence of a defendant in his own behalf, although unsupported and posi-
tively contradicted by the plaintiff, must be .submitted to the jury.
Prowattain v. Tindall, 30 P. F Smith 295, followed: Shaffer v. Clark,
90 Penn. St.
Contradiction of Written Evidence by Paro- When and to what extent
allowable-Suit by Administraf or-Parties incompetent as Witnesses -
[t is well settled, except in the case of negotiable paper, that parol evi
VOL. XXVIII.-74
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dence is admissible to contradict, vary or even avoid a written instru
ment, where it is proved that but for the oral stipulation it would not
have been executed: Hoopes v. Beale, 90 Penn. St.
Where the evidence of what occurred at the execution of the instru-
ment is clear and precise, there is no limitation to the power to modify,
explain or reform written agreements by parol evidence: Id.
A. executed a bond and mortgage to B., who assigned it to C. The
latter died, and in a suit brought by B. to the use of C.'s administrators:
Held, that parol evidence was admissible to prove that the bond and
mortgage were executed with the understanding that there would be no
personal liability. Held, further, that the suit being in reality by an
administrator, A. was incompetent as a witness: Id.
.Expert- Testimony as to Handwriting,-Where an expert acquires his
knowledge of the handwriting of a person by simply observing him
write several times, and this for the purpose of testifying, he is not com-
petent to give an opinion as to the genuineness of that person's signa-
ture: Reese v. Reese, 90 Penn. St.
Where it is alleged and denied that the body and signature of an in-
strument are in the same handwriting, an expert may be asked whether,
in his opinion, the two parts were written by the same person: Id.
EXPERT. See Evidence.
FRAUD. See Broker; Mortgage.
GUARANTY. See Bills and Notes.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Marriage, Dissolution of-Lunatic Petitioner- Commttee.-The lu-
nacy of a husband or wife is not a bar to a suit by the committee for
the dissolution of the lunatic's marriage. Such a suit may be instituted
by the committee of the estate of the lunatic: Baker v. Baker, Law
Rep. 5 Prob. Div.
Marriage--Divorce in Foreign Country-Bigamy.-Two English per-
sons married in England. The husband afterwards went to Kansas,
in the United States, and, after an interval of a year, presented a
petition and obtained a divorce by reason of his wife's desertion. He
then married again. The wife had received no notice of the petition.
Held, that, his domicile at the time of the divorce was English; and
that, therefore, the divorce was null and void, and he had committed
bigamy. Quire, whether the domicile of the wife is the domicile of
the husband, so as to compel her to become subject to the jurisdiction
of the tribunals of any country in which the husband may choose to
acquire a domicile: Briggs v. Briggs, Law Rep. 5 Prob. Div.
Marriage in England-Divorce in Scotland- Validity-The English
Divorce Court will recognise as valid the decree of a Scotch court
dissolving the marriage of domiciled Scotch persons though the marriage
was solemnized in England, and the woman was English prior to her
marriage. Semble, in some cases the English Divorce Court might
recognise as valid the decrees of a foreign court dissolving the marriages
of English persons: Harvey v. Farnie, Law Rep. 5 Prob. Div.
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INSURANCE.
Promise in Applikation- Violation of.-In an application for a life
insurance policy, the applicant declared, "that he does not now, nor
will he, practise any pernicious habit, which obviously tends to the
shortening of life." The policy issued in pursuance of said application
contained this provision: "If any of the statements or declarations
made in the application of this policy, upon the faith of which this
policy is issued, shall be found in any respect untrue, then and in
every such case, this policy shall be null and void." At the time of
making the application, the applicant was of correct and temperate
habits. Some years after the issuing of the policy, he became addicted
to the use of intoxicating drinks, from the immoderate use of which he
was attacked with delirium tremens, from the effects of which he died.
Held. that, in the absence of any clause in the policy avoiding it, in
case the assured should practise any such habit, and of any covenant or
warranty on his part that he would not do so, his mere declaration to
that effect in the application was not sufficient to avoid the policy:
Knecht v. Mutual L/'e Insurance Co. of New York, 90 Penn. St.
General Average-Expenses of warehousing and reshlpping Cargo
of Pilotage, and other Charges on Vessel leaving Port.-Where a vessel
goes into port of refuge, in consequence of an injury to her which is
itself the subject of general average, the expenses of warehousing and
reloading goods necessarily unloaded for the purpose of repairing the
injury, and expenses incurred for pilotage and other charges on the
vessel leaving the port, are also the subject of general average. So
held, by the Court of Appeal affirming the judgment of the majority of
the Queen's Beach Division: Atwood v. Sellar, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. Div.
INTEREST. See Usury.
JUDICIAL SALE.
Misconduct of Sheriff-AtUournment-Sale in Office-Setting aside.
-When a sheriff, without instructions, adjourned the sale of valuable
property from week to week in his office, and then sold without any
further advertisement, it appearing that the owner of the property sold
had been misled by such course, and was unaware of the sale. Held,
that, it was proper to set such sale aside upon equitable terms: Cham-
berlain v. Larned, 32 N. J. Eq.
LEASE. See Railroad.
LIEN. See Municipal Corporation.
MINE.
Winning-Apportionrent- Mixture of Goods.-By a deed of grant
and license the licensee was allowed to win and work all and every or
any of the coal mines, seam and seams of coal, within certain lands, and
in the first place, out of the profits to reimburse himself all expenses
incurred in the winning thereof: and it was provided that, after repay-
ment of all expenses of winning the said colliery, coal mines or coal mine,
seam or seams of coal, he should pay such royalty as should from time
to time be awarded by two arbitrators to be named by the parties respec-
tively. There were three seams of coal under the land. The licensee
reached one of them by a driftway from an adjoining colliery and
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worked the coal. He afterwards, by similar means, reached and worked
another of them. The third was also reached, but was abandoned as
worthless. Held, that, the coal was won according to the meaning of
the deed so soon as the first seam was reached through the driftway so
that it could be worked, and that the deed did not contemplate a
distinct winning in respect of each seam; and that, therefore, expenses
incurred after the first seam had been reached could not be treated as
expenses of winning: Lord Rokeby v. Elliot. Law Rep. 13 Chan. Div.
The licensee mixed the coals gotten under the license with those
gotten from his own colliery and sold them together. He alleged that
the coals gotten under the license were inferior in value to the other
coals. Held, that, as they had been mixed by the licensee's own act,
he was not entitled to an inquiry as to how much the selling price of
the coals was diminished by the mixture of the coals gotten under the
license: Id.
MIXTURE OF GOODS. See Mine.
MORTGAGE.
Assumption of Payment by Purchaser-Personal Liability to Mortgagee
- Contract- Consideration.-Although the clause, in a deed of convey-
ance, "under and subject" to a mortgage is a covenant of indemnity
only as between grantor and grantee for the protection of the former,
yet such grantee may so contract with his grantor as to make himself
personally liable to the mortgagee, for the amount of the mortgage, even
though his grantor was not so liable: Merriman v. Moore, 90 Penn. St.
A. conveyed land to B., "under and subject" to the payment of a
mortgage to C. The deed to A. contained no "under and subject"
clause. In a suit by C. against B., to recover the amount of the mort-
gage, C. offered to prove that when B. took the conveyance from A., he
expressly agreed that he would assume the payment of the mortgage,
and that the mortgage formed part of the consideration-money. field,
that such evidence should have been admitted. Held, further, that
although A. was not liable, yet his contract was not without considera-
tion, inasmuch as the price of the land was the consideration : Id.
It is a rudimentary principle that a party may sue on a promise made
on a sufficient consideration, for his use and benefit, though it be made
to another and not himself: Id.
Award of Damages to Mortgagor for Land taken for Railroad-
Equitable right of Mortgagee.-Under the charter of the New Egypt
and Farmingdale Railroad Company (Pamph. L. 1869, p. 471), a portion
of certain mortgaged lands were condemned for the company's use, in
proceedings of which the company had given notice to the mortgagors
only. Held, that the mortgagee was entitled in equity to have the sum
so awarded for the land and damages, applied towards the payment of
his debt, and the rest of the mortgaged premises, subject to the rights
of the railroad company, sold for the payment of the balance: Bright
v. I'latt, 32 N. J. Eq.
Given for Accommodation of Mortgagee-Misrepresentation-Bond
fide Purchaser.-That a mortgage was given for the temporary accommo-
dation of the mortgagee; that he intended to.use it only as collateral
security, and that he falsely represented himself then to be solvent, are
uo defence 1 such mortgage in the hands of a bona fide assignee, for
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value, without notice, who holds it under an absolute assignment:
Jacobsen v. Dodd, 32 N. J. Eq.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
Taxes-Psiovity of Lien oves Mortyage.-Although a municipal char-
ter did not expressly declare that taxes on lands within the city limits
should be paramount to any lien thereon, yet taxes assessed subse-
quently to the making and recording of a mortgage on ouch lands, were
held to be a prior lien, because such lands were, by the charter, to be
assessed at their full and fair value; and mortgages thereon were not
taxable in the hands of residents of this state; and a mortgagee or any
person interested might redeem such premises after a tax sale; and that,
notwithstanding the charter required the tax-sale purchaser to give
notice to the owner, after such purchase, and contained no express
direction as to such notice being given to the mortgagee: .Mayor and
Oty of Paterson v. O'Neill, 32 N. J. Eq.
NEGLIGENCE. See Constitutional Law.
Railroad-Fire started by Sparks-Proximate Cause-Submission to
JAry.-Sparks were thrown from an engine of a railroad company, to a
point on land adjoining the plaintiff's about three hundred feet from a
lumber pile, belonging to the plaintiff. The sparks set fire to combus-
tible materials, consisting of leaves, briers, brush, stumps and logs,
burning the same in its pathway, until it reached the plaintiff's lumber.
The weather was dry and & high wind was blowing in the direction of
the property destroyed. The fire reached the lumber about two hours
after it started, and could not be extinguished by any effort. In a suit
for the loss, there was evidence on the part of the defendant company
tending to another theory as to the origin and extent of the fire. Held,
that it was properly left to the jury to determine whether the negligence
of defendant was the proximate or remote cause of' the injury : Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co. v. Hope, 30 P. F. Smith 373, followed: Lehigh
Valley Railroad Co. v. M,.Keen, 90 Penn. St.
There was evidence on the part of plaintiff, that the sparks emitted
from the engine on the day of the fire were of unusual size. The
defendant gave evidence to show, that the engine was supplied with the
most approved spark-arrester, and asked the court to charge that there
was no proof of any want of care in the working of the engine, which
the court refused. Held, that the question of negligence was one of
fact and properly left to the jury: ITd.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. See Bills of Lading.
Certificate for work done for Municipality-Blank endorsement-As-
s'qnment-Pledge.-A certificate by the proper officer of the District of
Columbia that an account (f work done for the District was correct and
Iliat a certain amount was due thereon, is not a negotiable instrument,
and if endorsed in blank and pledged by the person in whose favor it
is, issued, a subsequent transferree takes it subject to all the equities of
the actual owner : Cbwdrey v. Vandenburgk, S. (. U. S., October Term
I A79.
Semble. If the pledgee had written an assignment above the blank
,'ldorsement, a subsequent purchaser for value without notice would
bave taken it free from such equities : Id.
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PATENT.
Abandonment-Delay in prosecuting Application-Effect of Commis-
sioner's Decision-Naming Witnesses in Answer-Act of Congress-
Construction of.-If an inventor after his application fbr a patent is
rejected, delays, without cause, for many years, to renew his application
or to appeal, and suffers his invention to go into common use, he is pre.
sunied to have abandoned it: Woodbury Patent Planing Machine Co
v. Keith, S. C. U. S, Oct. Term 1879.
Smith v. Dental Vulcanite Co, 93 U. S. 486, distinguished: Id.
The decision of the Commissioner of Patents upon a question of
abandonment, is not conclusive in a subsequent suit for infringement:
Id.
Under sect. 4920, Rev. Stat., a defendant is only required to give in
his answer the names of those who had invented or used the antici-
pating machine and not the names of those who are to testify of its
invention or use: Id.
PLEADING.
Bill in Euity- When not demurrable.-A bill is not demurrable if it
contains equitable merits, although it be admitted that some of the other
circumstances stated cannot be of avail: Reading v. Stover, 82 N. J. Eq.
PLEDGE. See Bailment.
RAILROAD. See Mortgage; Negligence.
Power to Lease Road-Absence of express Authority in Charter-
Power not implied from Authority to Contract with other Companies.-
A lease by a railroad company of all its road, rolling-stock and franchises
for which there is no express authority given in its charter is ultra vires
and void: Thomas v. West Jersey Railroad, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
The ordinary clause in the charter authorizing such corporations to
contract with other transportation companies, for the mutual transfer of
goods and passengers over each other's road, is no authority to lease its
road and franchises : .d.
Where upon a lease of this kind, for twenty years, the lessors have
resumed possession at the end of five years, and the accounts for that
period have been adjusted and paid, a condition in the lease to pay the
value of the unexpired term, is void, and the case does not come within
the principle that executed contracts which were originally ultra vires,
shall stand good for the protection of rights acquired under a completed
transaction : Id.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
Citizens of different States-Real Controversy-Position of Parties in
the Pleadings-Jurisdiction by Consent.-Where the real controversy is
between citizens of different states, the United States courts will take
jurisdiction, without regard to the position which the parties occupy
as plaintiffs or defendants: Pacific Railroad of Mo. v. Ketchum, S. U.
U. S., Oct. Term 1879.
Consent cannot give jurisdiction in such cases, but it may bind the
parties and waive previous errors if when the court acts jurisdiction
has been obtained: Id.
SALE. See Contract.
Auction-C onditions of Sale- Warranty.-The plaintiff bought a horse
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
by public auction at a repository, warranted to be a good worker subject
to the condition that " horses warranted good workers, whether sold by
private treaty or public auction, not answering such warranty must be
returned before five o'clock of the day after the sale: shall then be
tried by a person to be appointed by the auctioneer, and the decision of
such person shall be final." The horse was not returned within the stipu-
lated time: Held, on demurrer in an action on the warranty, that the
plaintiff's only remedy was under the condition, and that he could not
maintain the action: icllffe v. Barwick, Law Rep. 5 Excb. Div.
SALVAGE. See Admiralty.
SHIPPING. See Insurance.
Charter-party- To deliver at a given Port "or so near thereto as the
Ship could safely get"-ctstom inconsistent with the Contract.-
By a charter-party the vessel was to deliver at H., "or so near thereto
as she could safely get;" to discharge as custouilrv; the cargo to be
brought to and taken from alongside the ship at merchant's risk and
expense. The draught of water of the vessel with the cargo on board
was too great to allow her to reach H. The nearest point to which she
could safely get was S., where the merchant refused to accept delivery
of any part of the cargo. In order to lighten the vessel, part of her
cargo was discharged into lighters at S. and sent in them to H. Her
owner having sued the charterer to recover the lighterage expenses:
Held, that a defence alleging that by the custom of the port of H. the
defendant was not bound to take delivery elsewhere than at H. was bad
on demurrer, inasmuch as it sought to set up a custom inconsistent with
the written contract, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
lighterage expenses: Hayton v. Irwin, Law Rep. 5 C. P. Div.
SHERIFF. See Judicial Sale.
TAXATION. See Municipal Corporation.
Public charity-Institutions in which preference is given to Members
of a particulir Sect-Exemption.-Testatrix by her will provided for
the establishment of an asylum, whose object should be the maintenance
and education of white female orphan children of not less than four
years or more than eight: first, who shall have been baptised in the Prot-
estant Episcopal Church, in the city of Philadelphia : second, the same
class of children baptised in said church, in the state of Pennsylvania ;
third, all other white female orphan children, between the said years,
without respect to any other description or qualification whatever,
except that at all times, and in every case, the orphan children of
clergymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church shall have the preference.
The will contained further directions, that the form of worship and
instruction should be that observed and taught in the Episcopal Church.
and appointed the bishop of said church and his successors the per..
petual visitor. Hebl, that, the asylum is a "purely public charity,"
within the meaning of section 1, article 9 of the constitution, which
provides, that the legislature may exempt from taxation institutions of
purely public charity: Burd Orphan Asylum v. The School Distri'ct
of Upper Darby, 90 Penn. St.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE.
Person "acting in a fiduciary capaczty"--Manaqer of Estate.-The
Debtor's Act 1869, while abolishing the penalty of imprisonment for
debt in the case of an honest debtor, is intended for the punishment
of a fraudulent or dishonest debtor, and is in that sense vindictive:
Marris v. Ingram, Law Rep. 13 Cban. Div.
Barrett v. Hammond, 10 Chan. Div. 285, not followed: Id.
A "person acting in a fiduciary capacity," means a person who stands
in a fiduciary relation towards any other person who may be entitled to
call upon him to pay, whether suc4 other person is or is not the
plaintiff, or one of the plaintiffs, in the action in which the order for
payment has been made: Id.
A son in the course of management of one of his father's farms sold
part of the farming stock, and received the proceeds. Upon the father's
death an action was brought by parties interested in his estate against
the son for payment of the moneys received by him, and for accounts.
The son having failed to comply with an order made in the action for
payment of a sum of money into court. feld, that, he was a "' person
acting in a fiduciary capacity," within the Debtor's Act 1869; and
accordingly, the court not being satisfied that he had not the means of
payment, leave was given to the plaintiffs to issue a writ of attachment
against him for non-payment: Id.
UNDUE INFLUENCE.
What not.-That a testator's wife urged upon him the propriety of
leaving his property to her, does not constitute undue influence to vitiate
the will: Hughes v. furtha, 32 N. J. Eq.
USURY.
Payment for Extension of Time.-The payment of usurious interest,
after a debt becomes due, is not a valid consideration for an agreement
to give time: Hartman v. Danner, 24 P. F. Smith, 36 followed; Shaf-
fer v. Clark, 90 Penn. St.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Constitutional Law.
WILL.
Mental Capacity-Delusions-Burden of Proof-A man may be ca-
pable of transacting business of a complicated and important kind,
involving the exercise of considerable powers of intellect, and yet may
be subject to delusions so as to be unfit to make a will. But if the de.
lusions under which he labors are such that they could not reasonably
be supposed to have affected the dispositions made by his will, the will
would be valid. Banks v. Goodfellow, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 549, followed:
Smee v. S'me, Law Rep. 5 Probate Div.
The burden of proving capacity to make a will rests upon those who
propound the will, and, d fortiori, when it appears that the testator was
subject to delusions Id.
Interlineations-Attestation by Init~als.-The initials of a testatrix
and the attesting witnesses in the margin of the will opposite interlinea-
tions are sufficient to render the interlineations valid : In the Goods of
Blewit, Law Rep. 5 Probate Div.
